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JURISDICTION 
A. August 13, 1997, Order and Judgment. 
The Judgment and Order appealed from was entered August 13, 
1997. (R. 290-2861.) Plaintiffs served a Motion for New Trial on 
August 22, 1997, which was within ten days of the Judgment and 
Order. (R. 294-293.) The Courts Order Denying Motion for New 
Trial was entered November 6, 1997. (R. 345-342.) Plaintiffs 
filed their notice of appeal less than 3 0 days later, on November 
28, 1997. (R. 347-346.) The notice was timely. Utah R. App. P. 
4(a). 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) . The matter was poured over to the 
The pages in the record are organized in reverse chrono-
logical order, and as a result the pagination on each document runs 
in reverse order. 
Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
B. Claims of Robert Steele. 
Appellants' brief claims on page 2 that "this appeal is made 
by Jack Dansie and Bob Steele." Although Robert Steele and Juab 
Gypsum, L.L.C. were respondents to the order to show cause (R. 156-
155), only J. W. Dansie and Jean Dansie appealed. (R. 347-346.) 
This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the purported appeal by 
Robert Steele. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 
318 (1988). Also, Robert Steele did not join the motion for new 
trial, so any appeal by him would have been untimely. Notwith-
standing any action this court may take with respect to J. W. 
Dansie, therefore, the underlying Order will remain effective as to 
Robert Steele and Juab Gypsum, L.L.C. 
C. Prohibition on Sales to Asharove-Durkee. 
It is important to delineate exactly what J. W. Dansie is ap-
pealing. The June 18, 1996, order prohibited J. W. Dansie from 
selling gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee for 18 months or until Nephi 
Sandstone's gypsum failed to meet specifications, whichever 
occurred later. J. W. Dansie argued below that the order was in 
error, and that the limitation should only exist until the earlier 
of the passage of 18 months or the failure to meet specifications. 
(R. 172.) The trial court rejected that claim and specifically 
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found that the June 18, 1996, Order properly reflected the parties' 
agreement. (R. 266.) 
J. W. Dansie did not appeal from or otherwise challenge the 
June 18, 1996, Order. J. W. Dansie does not claim that the June 
18, 1996, Order is ambiguous. The June 18, 1996, Order is binding, 
i.e., J. W. Dansie, Robert Steele and Juab Gypsum, L.L.C. may not 
contact or contract with Ashgrove-Durkee for 18 months or until 
Nephi Sandstone gypsum fails to meet specifications, whichever last 
occurs. J. W. Dansie does not and cannot appeal the underlying 
order, but only the preventative injunction (the August 13, 1997, 
order) which seeks to prevent violation of the order. 
Even if J. W.Dansie were to prevail on his appeal and obtain 
a reversal of the preventative injunction, the underlying order 
(June 16, 1996) would still remain in force. This Court's 
jurisdiction is therefore limited to the issue of whether J. W. 
Dansie must seek prior court approval before selling gypsum to 
Ashgrove-Durkee. The primary issue addressed in the brief, 
however, is whether the trial court could prohibit sales to 
Ashgrove-Durkee for a potentially indefinite period of time. This 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider that issue. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where a party had previously sold materials to a 
particular customer in violation of a court order, did the court 
abuse its discretion by requiring specific permission from the 
court before making any future sales to that customer? 
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2. Is a court order prohibiting sales to a single customer, 
entered as a sanction for contempt of court, inherently 
unreasonable and therefore unenforceable simply because the 
prohibition may continue indefinitely? 
These issues arise in the context of an injunction issued by 
the trial court. The propriety of an injunction is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P. 2d 421, 
425 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellees do not contend that there are any constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil proceeding seeking 
sanctions for civil contempt of court. The proceeding arose in the 
context of a civil lawsuit concerning an agreement for the purchase 
of a business. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On November 
4, 1996, defendants filed their Motion for Order to Show Cause (R. 
147-145), claiming that plaintiffs and Robert Steele had violated 
a court order entered June 18, 1996. (R. 144-138.) The court 
issued the requested order to show cause. (R. 156-155.) An 
evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause was held February 11 
and March 25, 1997. (R. 222-221, 240-239.) 
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On June 11, 1997, the court issued its ruling finding against 
defendants on the issues related to Robert Steele, but finding in 
favor of defendants on the issues related to J. W. Dansie. (R. 
261-241,) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 285-263) and 
an Order and Judgment (R. 290-286) were entered on August 13, 1997. 
On August 22, 1997, plaintiffs served a Motion for New Trial. 
(R. 294-293.) The court issued a ruling denying the motion on 
September 19, 1997 (R. 340-339), and a formal Order Denying Motion 
for New Trial was entered November 6, 1997. (R. 345-342.) 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on November 28, 1997. (R. 
347-346.) 
C, Statement of Facts. 
On January 10, 1995, plaintiffs sued their son, Craig Dansie, 
and their son-in-law, Bruce H. Evans, claiming breach of an 
agreement whereby Craig and Bruce were to become owners of Nephi 
Sandstone Corporation. (R. 6-1.) Craig and Bruce answered the 
complaint and filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs asserting 
that Nephi Sandstone was failing and unprofitable when Craig and 
Bruce took over operations under an agreement whereby they would 
purchase the business from plaintiffs. The counterclaim asserted 
that plaintiffs had violated the agreement by attempting to remove 
a certain gypsum mine, known as the Levan Mine, from the assets of 
Nephi Sandstone Corporation. The counterclaim also asserted that 
plaintiffs had libeled and slandered Craig and Bruce by statements 
to customers. (R. 16-9.) 
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The issues raised in the complaint were resolved by a 
Stipulation filed February 29, 1996. (R. 137-130.) Several 
individuals and entities not party to the action, including Robert 
Steele, acknowledged the Stipulation and agreed to be bound by it. 
(R. 130.) An Order approving the Stipulation was entered June 18, 
1996. (R. 144-138.) 
Paragraph 1 of the Order prohibited each of the parties from 
making any "derogatory, demeaning or belittling comments about any 
of the other parties to any individual." Paragraph 3 of the Order 
included the following: 
3. J. W. Dansie and Robert Steele, 
together with all other owners of the Juab 
Gypsum, L.L.C., are ordered not to attempt to 
contact or enter into any contracts with 
Ashgrove Cement Company-Leamington; Ashgrove 
Cement Company-Durkee, Oregon; Ashgrove Cement 
Company-Inkom, Idaho; Soda Springs Phosphate; 
Morrison Fertilizer; Agri-Nu; and North 
Pacific Trading, which are all customers of 
Nephi Sandstone Corporation, for a period of 
eighteen months from the date of the parties 
[sic] Stipulation (February 12, 1996) or for 
so long as the gypsum from Nephi Sandstone's 
operation of the Salt Creek Mine continues to 
meet Ashgrove Cement's specifications, which-
ever is later. 
The trial court found that J. W. Dansie, notwithstanding the 
prohibition in the court order against making derogatory 
statements, made derogatory comments about Craig and Bruce to a 
number of individuals. (R. 277 f 50.) The court also found that 
when Jason Dansie, who was Craig's son and J. W.'s grandson, went 
to deliver something to J. W., J. W. "began to shake and yell that 
there was going to be a bloody mess. He was angry at Craig and 
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Bruce and called them profane and offensive names, asserting that 
Craig and Bruce were greedy." (R. 277 f 51.) 
The trial court found that J. W. Dansie had sold at least 19 
carloads of gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee. (R. 281 1 25.) J. W. Dansie 
claimed that the shipment to Ashgrove-Durkee was permissible 
because Nephi Sandstone had failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee's 
specifications.2 (R. 281 f 26.) The court rejected this claim for 
two reasons. First, the court found that J. W. Dansie did not 
learn of the alleged breach of specifications until after he had 
agreed to ship the gypsum. (R. 278 f 42.) Second, the court found 
that Nephi Sandstone did not fail to meet the Ashgrove-Durkee 
specifications. (R. 279.) The court found that Nephi Sandstone 
lost $10,525.00 in profits by reason of the improper shipment of 
gypsum. (R. 276 f 56.) 
As a sanction for J. W. Dansie's derogatory statements 
concerning his son and son-in-law, the court imposed a fine of 
$1,000.00 and ordered that J. W. Dansie perform 80 hours of 
community service. Mr. Dansie's co-respondent, Robert Steele, has 
2
 J. W. Dansie claimed that Ashgrove-Durkee discovered some 
large rocks in the bottom of the railcars used to ship the gypsum. 
The court found that the rocks were not gypsum and were not similar 
to the kind of rock adjacent to the gypsum mine. (R. 280 f 34.) J. 
W. Dansie also asserted a failure to meet delivery timetables. 
Nephi Sandstone's purchase order with Ashgrove-Durkee required that 
they ship five cars of gypsum per week from mid-March to mid-
November, 1996. (R. 280, f 35.) During that time frame, Nephi 
Sandstone shipped 192 cars of gypsum which averaged more than five 
cars per week. There was a period of 21 days, however, when no 
gypsum was shipped. The trial court found that this did not 
constitute a failure to meet specifications. (R. 279.) 
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submitted a letter to the court claiming that J. W. Dansie has 
performed the community service. (R. 341.) 
As a sanction for the improper sales to Ashgrove-Durkee, the 
court imposed a fine of $1,000.00 and also entered an injunction 
prohibiting J. W. Dansie or his company, Juab Gypsum, L.L.C., from 
selling materials to Ashgrove-Durkee "unless or until [the] court 
makes a finding that Nephi Sandstone has breached a specification 
or unless or until the passage of time provided in the [June 18, 
1996] order." (R. 288.) J. W. Dansie has appealed that order. 
(R. 347.) 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Appellants claim the trial court's order creates an improper 
non-competition agreement. The court's order was not, however, an 
agreement; it was an injunction to prohibit violation of a prior 
court order. Where J. W. Dansie had previously violated a court 
order and had attempted to excuse that violation by an after-the-
fact claim that defendants' gypsum failed to meet minimum product 
specifications, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
requiring J. W. Dansie to seek prior court approval before engaging 
in future sales which may violate the court order. 
Even if the court order is viewed as an agreement, however, it 
is still proper. A contractual limitation on competition can be 
enforced if it is reasonable in its restrictions as to time and 
area. A majority of courts have held that an indefinite time 
restriction may be reasonable if the area of restraint is narrow. 
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The area of restraint in this case is limited to a single existing 
customer of the defendants. Even though the restraint is poten-
tially indefinite, the restraint is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REQUIRING PRIOR COURT APPROVAL 
OF SALES BY J. W. DANSIE TO ASHGROVE-DURKEE. 
On June 18, 1996, the trial court, by Order based on the 
stipulation of the parties, prohibited "J. W. Dansie and Robert 
Steele, together with all other owners of the Juab Gypsum, L.L.C." 
from contacting or contracting with Ashgrove Cement Company-Durkee, 
Oregon, which was an existing customer of defendants, "for a period 
of eighteen months from the date of the parties [sic] Stipulation 
(February 12, 1996) or for so long as the gypsum from Nephi 
Sandstone's operation of the Salt Creek Mine continues to meet 
Ashgrove Cement's specifications, whichever is later." (R. 143.) 
The trial court found that in the spring of 1996, which was almost 
immediately after the stipulation was entered, J. W. Dansie 
contacted Ashgrove-Durkee, and in October, 1996, shipped 19 
railroad carloads of gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee. (R. 281-280.) 
After making the agreement to ship the gypsum, J. W. Dansie learned 
of two circumstances which he later claimed constituted a failure 
to meet Ashgrove-Durkee's specifications. The trial court found 
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that Nephi Sandstone had not failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee's 
specifications. 
In addition to imposing a sanction for the past violation of 
the order, the trial court entered an injunction to prevent J. W. 
Dansie from committing future violations of the order. The court 
simply required that J. W. Dansie obtain a court finding of 
specification violation before undertaking to ship gypsum to 
Ashgrove-Durkee. J. W. Dansie now challenges that preventative 
injunction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
entering that order under the circumstances of this case. 
The propriety of an injunction restraining competition is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not 
be reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion. System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). It cannot 
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. 
J. W. Dansie had already demonstrated his contempt by violating at 
least two provisions of the June 18, 1996, Order. The court's 
finding demonstrates a need for close court supervision to prevent 
further violations: 
At least as to J. W. , this is not a 
particularly close case. In observing him at 
the evidentiary hearing and listening to his 
explanations of his actions, it is clear that 
he has an animus toward his son and son-in-law 
(defendants) . He saw a sliver of an excuse to 
reenter the gypsum market in competition with 
them, and he loaded up his railcars and 
crashed them through that sliver into the 
broad daylight. J. W. evidenced no recog-
nition of any wrongdoing, and he demonstrated 
an attitude of disregard for the legal obliga-
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tions imposed upon him by the agreement, which 
he reached with his son and son-in-law (de-
fendants) . The Court finds and concludes that 
J. W. is in contempt of the Court's order. 
(R. 270.) 
The court also found what it characterized as "disturbing11 
violations of the order to not make derogatory comments about other 
parties. (R. 269-268.) This case arises out of a dispute among 
family members, and the trial court characterizes it as a "sad 
case." (R. 253.) Perhaps most instructive is the court's 
explanation for denying J. W. Dansie's motion for a new trial: 
Second, it is troubling that after his 
counsel helped him negotiate a settlement with 
his son and son-in-law, after he signed the 
agreement, after it was presented to the Court 
as his voluntary agreement and after it was 
incorporated into an order of the Court, at 
the first opportunity J. W. Dansie set about 
to violate the court order. His defense is 
that it contains an invalid non-competition 
agreement. 
This case as [sic] far different from the 
usual non-competition agreement case for the 
simple reason that we are not considering 
whether J. W. Dansie violated a non-
competition agreement, but whether J. W. 
Dansie violated an order of this Court. In 
this case I am called upon to construe and 
enforce a court order rather than a private 
agreement. And I have found clear and 
convincing evidence that J. W. Dansie did 
violate the order. While J. W. Dansie asserts 
that the order contains an invalid provision, 
his remedy is not to thumb his nose at the 
agreement for which he bargained or at the 
Court which issued the order, but to seek 
relief from the Court. Instead he chose a 
path of contempt. 
(R. 340-339.) 
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Where J. W. Dansie had clearly demonstrated his propensity to 
use any excuse to violate the prior court order, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in requiring prior court approval 
before J. W. Dansie could undertake sales to Ashgrove-Durkee. The 
trial court's order should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE RESTRAINT ON COMPETITION WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. 
J. W. Dansie did not appeal from the June 18, 1996, Order 
which prohibited him from making sales to Ashgrove-Durkee until 
after the passage of 18 months or until Nephi Sandstone's gypsum 
failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee's specifications, whichever occurred 
later. J. W. Dansie also did not challenge the trial court's 
denial of his motion to amend that earlier order. J. W. Dansie 
nonetheless claims that the provisions of that June 18, 1996, 
Order, which were enforced by the order appealed from, constitute 
an illegal non-competition "agreement.ff Although the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this claim, if the Court were to reach the 
issue, it should hold that the provision is proper. 
To be enforceable, a non-competition agreement must (1) be 
supported by consideration, (2) not be a product of bad faith, (3) 
be necessary to protect the good will of the business, and (4) "be 
reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area." System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425-26 (Utah 1983), citing 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823, 828 
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(1951) . The only element at issue here is the fourth one, whether 
the restriction as to time and area is reasonable. 
The law recognizes two types of covenants not to compete: 
covenants not to compete between an employer and employee, and 
covenants not to compete following a transfer or conveyance of 
ownership of a business. Covenants in the first category are 
strictly construed, while covenants of the second category are not. 
Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 224 (Nev. 1979); Amex Distributing 
Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); DBA 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Findlay, 923 P.2d 298, 302 (Ct. App.), cert, 
denied (Colo. 1996). 
J. W. Dansie claims that the court order imposed an in-
definite3 restriction on competition and asserts that such restric-
tions are invalid. J. W. Dansie relies on three cases to support 
his claim: Three Phoenix Co. v. Pace Industries, Inc., 659 P.2d 
1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Gynecologic Oncology, P.C. v. Weiser, 
443 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); National Graphics Co. v. 
Dillev, 681 P.2d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Of these cases, only 
Three Phoenix arises in the context of the sale of a business, and 
defendants do not agree that the restriction was for an 
indefinite period of time. Craig and Bruce presented evidence that 
the gypsum from the Salt Creek Mine would likely last only two to 
three years. (R. 265-264.) The trial court made no finding on 
this issue. If this Court should determine that some restriction 
as to time is required, the matter should be remanded for a 
determination of how long the Salt Creek Mine gypsum supply will 
last, and whether that constitutes a reasonable limitation on the 
non-competition provision. 
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that opinion was vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court. Three 
Phoenix Co. v. Pace Industries. Inc.. 659 P.2d 1258 (Ariz. 1983). 
More importantly, the principle reflected in these cases is a 
minority view. "The overwhelming majority of the cases lend 
support to the rule that the mere fact, standing alone, that a 
restrictive covenant not to compete, ancillary to a contract of 
sale or other transfer of property, contains no time limit does not 
render the restriction ipso facto unenforceable." Annot., Enforce-
ability of covenant against competition, ancillary to sale or other 
transfer of business, practice, or property, as affected by 
duration of restriction. 45 A.L.R.2d 77, 105 (1956). The majority 
rule was applied in Utah in Lashus v. Chamberlain. 6 Utah 385, 24 
P. 188 (1890), which enforced an indefinite restriction on 
operating a competing hotel business in Ogden. 
This is consistent with the decision in System Concepts. Inc. 
v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), which involved the corollary 
concept of a non-compete agreement with no restriction as to area 
but a short restriction as to time. The court held that "[t]he 
reasonableness of the restraints in a restrictive covenant is 
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case and the 
subject covenant." 669 P. 2d at 427. In that case, the entire 
market was approximately 2,500 potential customers worldwide. In 
light of the narrow market, the court held that an unlimited 
territorial restriction was not unreasonable: "Furthermore, the 
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breadth of the covenant is sufficiently limited by the specific 
activity restrictions, which, under the peculiar circumstances of 
this case, have greater utility and propriety than a spacial 
restriction." Id. 
In the instant case, the challenged order prohibits sales to 
a single division of a single company.4 A more narrow spacial 
restriction could hardly be imagined. Ashgrove-Durkee was an 
existing customer of Nephi Sandstone. Given the unique circum-
stances of this case, it was not unreasonable for the court to 
prohibit J. W. Dansie from interfering with that single customer 
for an indefinite period of time. The judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
4The August 13, 1997, Order and Judgment only expressly applied 
to contacts or contracts with Ashgrove-Durkee. (R. 288.) The June 
18, 1996, Order, in contrast, prohibited contacts or contracts with 
"Ashgrove Cement Company-Leamington; Ashgrove Cement Company-
Durkee, Oregon; Ashgrove Cement Company-Inkom, Idaho; Soda Springs 
Phosphate; Morrison Fertilizer; Agri-Nu; and North Pacific Trading, 
which are all customers of Nephi Sandstone Corporation." 
J.W. Dansie argues on page 2 of his brief that the trial court 
enjoined him from "directly or indirectly competing with the 
defendants specifically until the Court finds that the product 
shipped by defendants fails to meet specifications of certain of 
its buyers." On page 4 J.W. Dansie argues that "The Trial Court 
ruled that plaintiffs cannot ever compete with Nephi Sandstone's 
customers until the Court finds that defendants' gypsum fails 
specification." 
Neither of these statements is correct—the prohibition does 
not apply to all customers of Nephi Sandstone. Defendants agree, 
however, that although the August 13, 1997, Order and Judgment 
expressly only applies to sales to Ashgrove-Durkee, the spirit of 
the order was that it also applies to each of the customers listed 
in the June 18, 1996, Order. Even if broadened to include all the 
listed customers, the restriction is still sufficiently narrow. 
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POINT III 
APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The trial court properly awarded defendants part of their 
attorney fees incurred in defending this case, and J. W. Dansie has 
not challenged the award on appeal. This Court should direct that 
appellees be awarded their attorney fees incurred in defending the 
appeal, the amount to be determined by the trial court on remand. 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 
409 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
It was reasonable for the trial court to require J. W. Dansie 
to seek prior court approval of any claim that defendants had 
failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee specifications for gypsum. Indeed, 
given J. W. Dansie 's prior history of contempt, any lesser 
requirement may have been unreasonable. 
Even if the restriction on competition is viewed as in-
definite, it is enforceable because the scope of restriction is 
limited to only one potential customer. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed in all respects, and appellees should be 
awarded their attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this V^ day of August, 1998. 
CRAIG M. SNYDER, and K 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 0 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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